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Viewing the International Labour 
Organization’s Social Justice Praxis 
Through a Third World Approaches 
to International Law Lens:  
Some Preliminary Insights
Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Titilayo Adebola and Basema Al-Alami
I. Introduction
The overarching objective of this paper is to shine a Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) torchlight on the ILO’s social 
justice discourse and praxis to find out what can be seen, or seen in a new 
light, or seen in a different way, when the TWAIL approach is adopted, 
and to comment on the significance of our findings, if any. To this end, 
the paper pursues two specific and intertwined goals, namely: (i) to analyt‑
ically tease out the similarities and differences between TWAIL’s avowedly 
(global) social justice discourse and praxis and its ILO counterpart; and (ii) 
to, in the light of the findings of the preceding exercise, reflect on what (if 
anything) the ILO’s and TWAIL’s social justice discourses and praxis can 
learn from each other.
In the light of these goals, the paper will necessarily begin with a brief 
explanation of what TWAIL stands for as an intellectual social justice 
movement and as a ‘networked’ school of thought in international legal 
studies. This exercise will be followed by an examination of what we see as 
the ‘commanding heights’ of the ILO’s social justice discourse and praxis 
(workers’ rights, other economic and social rights, and the rights of in‑
digenous peoples). Thereafter, a number of preliminary insights from an 
engagement between the TWAIL and ILO social justice discourses and 
praxis will be offered. The paper ends with some brief concluding comments.
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II. Explaining TWAIL
While TWAIL is an intellectual movement, and is not partisan, it also 
does not float high above politics in the way too many schools of thought 
present themselves – not always with credibility.1 What binds TWAIL 
scholars (TWAILers) is a rock‑solid commitment to the difficult task of 
producing international law scholarship that (i) uncovers how international 
law disadvantages the Third World and/or (ii) envisions ways to change or 
transform international law to accommodate much more equitably than 
is currently the case, the interests of Third World peoples.2 TWAIL work 
is global social justice work, and is vitally important to international law 
scholarship and practice, because hitherto, international law – both its texts 
and the living law as it is actually applied and experienced – has generally 
(albeit not totally) functioned in a way that systematically disempowers, 
dispossesses and disadvantages the Third World.3 It is therefore important 
to adopt or at least listen keenly to TWAIL in order to be in a better pos‑
ition to push or coax both the texts and the living versions of international 
law in the right directions, and progressively right the wrongs of the past 
and present.
So, where exactly is this ‘Third World’ located, this geo‑political expres‑
sion that TWAIL argues has, in general, tended to be subordinated by 
the living international law praxis? In a ground‑breaking paper, Karin 
Mickelson imagined the Third World as a ‘chorus of voices’.4 In a chorus, 
you have all types of pitches and voices. But in the best choirs, their songs 
come out harmoniously. China is not Botswana, Botswana is not Nigeria. 
Nonetheless, on most issues, these different countries have very many shared 
concerns, which is because they have a history of being subordinated or 
being treated with in similar ways. This is why despite China’s great and 
rapid economic growth and its new position as a major global power itself, 
1 Makau Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (2000) 94 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of 
the American Society of International Law 31.
2 ibid. See also Obiora Chinedu Okafor, ‘Newness, Imperialism and International Legal 
Reform in our Time: A TWAIL Perspective’ (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 171.
3 Mutua (n 1); Okafor (n 2).
4 Karin Mickelson, ‘Rhetoric and Rage, Third World Voices in International Legal 
Discourse’ (1998) 16 Wisconsin International Law Journal 353.
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it still aligns on almost every issue with the G77 at the UN; an alliance that 
now self‑describes as the ‘G77+China’.5
Thus, the Third World is an appellation that is affixed to the peoples 
and the States in which those peoples live that have, broadly speaking, ex‑
perienced a particular kind of historical subordination with specific prop‑
erties at the hands of global power formations (be they the Royal Niger 
Company, the Dutch East India company, the European colonial powers, 
and the contemporary global hegemon); the places where this has been most 
intense or pronounced.
The Third World is not, however, a ‘fixed geographic space’.6 
Nevertheless, there is a remarkable consistency of those who self‑identify 
as ‘Third World’. There are, of course, material circumstances that have led 
to their broadly shared sense of self and understandings of the world and 
international law’s orientation and valency as both text and practice. Thus, 
as Upendra Baxi has noted, there are also certain ‘geographies of injustice’7 
that shape the location of the Third World. In the last 100 years or so, these 
geographies of injustice have tended to point in certain well‑known direc‑
tions: the former European colonies in Asia, Africa and Latin America. But 
there is also the notion that at least the understandable conception of the 
‘Third World’ needs to be eased open to accommodate the South within 
the North – the so‑called ‘Fourth World’.8 What is more, as discussed in 
Chimni’s work, one should not forget the North within the South. This is 
not a completely new concept because the concept of ‘compradors’ (from 
Marxism) has been around with us for a long time. There is for sure a South 
within the North and an emerging North within the South. However, in 
line with B.S. Chimni’s position, it is argued that while there may be a 
5 For example, see the position of this group at the recent UN Conference on South‑
South Cooperation (BAPA+40) (March 2019) <https://www.unsouthsouth.org/bapa40/
statements/>.
6 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, ‘Locating the Third World in Cultural Geography’ (1999) 
15 Third World Legal Studies 1.
7 Upendra Baxi, ‘Geographies of Injustice: Human Rights at the Altar of Convenience’ 
in Craig Scott (ed), Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of 
Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Hart Publishing 2001) 197.
8 Amar Bhatia, ‘The South of the North: Building on Critical Approaches to 
International Law with Lessons from the Fourth World’ (2012) Oregon Review of 
International Law 131.
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North within the South, it is not the same North. There are differences in 
the features of the North in the North and the North in the South. Space 
limitations does not allow the adumbration of this point here.
TWAIL analysis is not, however, de‑mobilized by the fact that the 
Third World with which it is mostly concerned may not have perfectly 
exact boundaries. It remains a cogent theoretical framework and meth‑
odology that is as cogent as other broad frameworks and methodologies. 
For instance, it has been argued that TWAIL offers both theories of, and 
methodologies for, analyzing international law and institutions; TWAIL 
may also be thought of as a broad approach.9 That paper began by exam‑
ining the conventional features of theories and methodologies. Without 
necessarily accepting those features as immanent or canonical benchmarks 
for ‘measurement’ or assessment, it tried to discover the extent to which 
TWAIL matches the features of these traditionally established theories 
and methodologies. It found that TWAIL does indeed match the features 
of these more conventional theories and methodologies.
However, it should be kept in mind that TWAIL does enjoy a rich and 
productive kind of internal variegation. Some TWAILers are more opposi‑
tional than reconstructive. Some focus more on pointing out the problems 
with international law’s engagement with the Global South. For example, 
scholars like Joel Ngugi have asserted that TWAIL should be entirely 
oppositional (arguing that you cannot put old wine in new wineskins and 
expect it to taste any better).10 He had assumed a harder post‑structuralist 
stance at the time. Conversely, B.S. Chimni takes the opposing view. He 
has always insisted that TWAIL should not merely ferret out the disadvan‑
taging and dispossessing aspects of international law.11 Instead, TWAILers 
should imagine a new international law – a more just international order.12 
Nevertheless, like feminists for example, TWAILers are all united solidly 
9 Obiora Chinedu Okafor, ‘Critical Third World Approaches to International Law: 
Theory, Methodology, or Both?’ (2010) 10 International Community Law Review 371.
10 Joel Ngugi, ‘Making New Wine for Old Wineskins: Can the Reform of International 
Law Emancipate the Third World in the Age of Globalization’ (2002) 8 UC Davis Journal 
of International Law and Policy 73.
11 Bhupinder Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’ 
in Antony Anghie et al (eds), The Third World and International Legal Order: Law, Politics 
and Globalization (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003) 52.
12 ibid.
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by an ethical commitment to focus their analytical lens on the subjects 
and objects that contribute to the subordination and disadvantaging of 
the Third World, and to imagine or re‑imagine an international law/order 
that will not dispossess or disadvantage the Third World. That is what 
binds TWAILers, to analytically centre the Rest rather than the West. And 
so, despite the rich variegation within it, TWAIL offers a vastly coherent 
approach to the study of international law and international relations. It 
should be kept in mind (and this bears repetition) that the kind of differ‑
entiation that characterizes TWAIL is also exhibited by all other recog‑
nized schools of thought. At the level of detail, all schools of thought and 
approaches also have variegations and internal differences. On‑the‑whole, 
however, considering that TWAIL is a big tent, it is better to think of it as 
a set of approaches that cohere at a level, as an approach. This would save us 
time lost to endless debates about narrow positivist notions of what theories 
are and are not, and what methodologies are or are not.
In terms of the methods that TWAIL scholars deploy,13 the very first 
thing that TWAIL approaches require us to do is to take history seriously. 
This is crucial to TWAIL work, albeit not unique to it. TWAIL scholars 
map the techniques, devices and technologies used by global power in the 
past and present. One cannot adequately map and think through how 
global power circulates and operates today in international law and rela‑
tions without understanding how it functioned in the past in that context. 
If you have studied the past, you are better equipped to recognize it in 
today’s manoeuvres and operations of the law. In looking at history, TWAIL 
scholars look not only at continuity, but also discontinuity. Continuity and 
discontinuity exist simultaneously, but in what relative measure?
Second, in taking history seriously, TWAIL scholars take global history 
seriously; that is to say not just the history of the West, but also the his‑
tory of the Rest.14 TWAIL scholars seek to write the Third World’s shared 
historical experiences into the processes and outcomes of international 
legal thought and action. For example, with intellectual property, questions 
to ponder include: historically, what was the relationship of intellectual 
property to the Third World? Was intellectual property used to extract 
13 For these methods, see Okafor (n 2).
14 ibid.
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resources? If one were to look at issues from the perspectives of Third World 
peoples, what may they think about intellectual property laws and the inter‑
national regimes that underpin them?
Third, TWAIL takes the normative equality of Third World peoples 
seriously.15 TWAIL insists that all thoughts and actions concerning inter‑
national law and international relations should proceed on the assumption 
that Third World peoples deserve no less rights and dignity than citizens 
of the West. For example, a TWAIL examination of the arguments that 
international law should allow the ‘consensual’ transfer of toxic waste from 
the Global North to the Global South reveals how the law demeans and 
endangers the lives of the Third World peoples.16
Fourth, TWAILers are informed by a deep attentiveness to the histor‑
ically persistent misuse and abuse of notions of universality and claims of 
common humanity which have licensed the subjugation, suppression and 
dispossession of the Third World throughout history. The early chapters 
of Antony Anghie’s book explain how that was precisely the technique 
the Spanish used in conquering Latin America.17 TWAILers are – quite 
rightly – very suspicious of glib or facial notions or assertions of univer‑
sality.18 For example, Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah correctly notes that 
‘a lesson to be learnt [from Third World history] is that one must beware 
of self‑proclaimed universalists whose […] reasons for taking universalist 
stances must be constantly scrutinized’.19 Again, this is not peculiar 
to TWAIL.
Fifth, TWAILers study the resistance of Third World peoples to global 
hegemonies and their effects. For example, Blakrishnan Rajagopal’s work 
on development in international law comes readily to mind.20 And some 
of Titilayo Adebola’s work on the ways of resisting the expropriation of the 
intellectual property of Third World peoples using formal legal techniques 
15 ibid.
16 ibid.
17 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 
(Cambridge UP 2005).
18 ibid.
19 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, ‘The Asian Perspective to International Law in the 
Age of Globalization’ (2001) 5 Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 284.
20 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below (Cambridge UP 2003).
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falls within this genre.21 How do you resist the deployment of the prin‑
ciples of law? Some TWAILers study resistance and techniques of resisting 
hegemonic laws.
The above is not an exhaustive list, but it covers examples of techniques 
used by TWAILers. Although many of these techniques are not in them‑
selves unfamiliar to other critical international law scholars, it is their use in 
combination one with the other and their being squarely focused on the treat‑
ment of Third World peoples in and by international law and relations that 
provides them with their distinctiveness as TWAIL methods/techniques.
III. The ILO’s social justice discourse and praxis
Since its creation, the ILO has adopted 190 conventions, 6 protocols 
and 206 recommendations that address a wide range of issues, ranging from 
minimum wages and working conditions to discrimination and social se‑
curity. Setting international labour standards goes to the heart of the work 
of the Organization. Depending on the context, histories, and so on, such 
standards can have a salutary effect on the enjoyment of the social and 
economic rights of workers, as well as on the realization of the rights of 
indigenous peoples.
The promotion and enhancement of social justice sits at the core of the 
ILO’s mandate, as the Organization is committed to improving labour con‑
ditions around the world, almost always in situations and contexts involve 
social‑economic injustices and hardships for some (though not all).22 In fact, 
the ILO is often celebrated in the academic realm as one of the few inter‑
national organizations that has a mandate that is squarely focused on social 
justice.23 While the Offices of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, among others, may 
21 Titilayo Adebola, ‘Access and Benefit Sharing, Farmers’ Rights and Plant Breeders’ 
Rights: Reflections on the African Model Law’ (2019) 9 Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual 
Property 105.
22 Monique Zarka‑Martres and Monique Guichard‑Kelly, ‘Decent Work, Standards and 
Indicators’ in David Kucera (ed), Qualitative Indicators of Labour Standards: Comparative 
Methods and Applications (Springer 2007) 83.
23 Guy Ryder, ‘The International Labour Organization: The next 100 years’ (2015) 57 
Journal of Industrial Relations 748.
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dispute this conclusion, the main point being made here is that the attain‑
ment of social justice is so central to the ILO’s work that it tends to stand 
out in that regard. This section of the paper explores the ILO’s social justice 
mandate and its relevance for, and consequences on, workers’ rights, social 
and economic rights more generally, as well as on indigenous peoples’ rights.
1. What is social justice?
Given that social justice is at the heart of the ILO’s mandate, one must 
understand what is meant by social justice before analyzing it in the context 
of the ILO’s work. Thomas Pogge has adopted an institutional approach 
to justice, arguing that the principles of justice apply to the basic structure 
of society and its rules. This basic structure consists of the most prominent 
institutions of society, particularly those that fundamentally shape society 
and hence have profound and pervasive effects on people’s lives.24 These 
institutions include:
society’s basic mode of economic organization; the procedures for 
making social choices through the conduct of […] individuals and 
groups […]; the more important practices regulating civil (noneco‑
nomic and nonpolitical) interactions, such as the family or the edu‑
cation system; and the procedures for interpreting and enforcing the 
rules of the scheme.25
Furthermore, according to Pogge, what is key to the notion of global 
justice are the negative duties that impose constraints on conduct that 
worsens the situation of others.26 Pogge’s analysis of global justice relies 
to a large extent on human rights, which he regards as the core values of 
society’s moral and political discourses.27 Hence, according to Pogge, insti‑
tutional order is unjust if it foreseeably generates a human rights deficit.28 
Other renowned scholars have also delved into the notion of social justice, 
especially as it pertains to workers. According to ILO’s Director‑General 
24 Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (1st edn Cornell UP 1989) 22.
25 ibid 22–23.
26 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and 
Reforms (2nd edn Polity Press 2008) 15.
27 Thomas Pogge, ‘Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Program’ (2005) 36 
Metaphilosophy 182, 195. Pogge (n 24) 25.
28 ibid.
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Guy Ryder, for example, ‘social justice is not synonymous with inequality, 
but it coincides very strongly with inequality’.29 Clearly, the inequalities 
that societies have been undergoing for decades produced, and continue to 
produce, social injustice.30
2. The ILO and social justice
One key significance of the notion of social justice in the context of 
international law, and more particularly international labour law, is set 
out in the preamble of the ILO Constitution. The preamble states that 
‘universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon 
social justice’. The preamble also highlights a number of concrete meas‑
ures urgently required in order for social justice to be achieved around the 
world, such as the establishment of a maximum number of work hours in 
a day or week, the provision of adequate wages, and the prevention of un‑
employment. It therefore seems that such measures are fundamental to the 
Organization’s social justice mandate, and that social justice is in turn key 
to its overall remit.
As we have seen already, the preamble also draws a direct link between 
the notion of social justice and that of world peace and security.31 The 
ILO’s website states that the ‘aspiration’ for social justice involves working 
men and women freely claiming ‘on the basis of equality of opportunity 
their fair share of the wealth which they have helped to generate’.32 As 
Marius Staden puts it, it seems that ‘the real reason for the establishment 
of the organisation was […] the need to achieve social justice so as to avoid 
war and revolution’.33 This makes it even clearer that the pursuit of (spe‑
cific types of) social justice goals are a key part of the ILO’s raison d’ être. 
According to Staden, the founding principles of ILO have been reformu‑
lated on three different occasions: the Declaration of Philadelphia 1944, 
29 Ryder (n 23) 751.
30 ibid.
31 In the Constitution, member States agreed that they were ‘moved by sentiments of 
justice and humanity as well as by the desire to secure the permanent peace of the world’.
32 ILO, ‘The need for social justice’ <https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduc‑
tion‑to‑international‑labour‑standards/need‑for‑social‑justice/lang‑‑en/index.htm>.
33 Marius Staden, ‘Towards a South African Understanding of Social Justice: The 
International Labour Organisation Perspective’ (2012) Journal of South African Law 91, 95.
110 Third world approaches to ILO social justice praxis
the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 1998, and 
the Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalisation 2008, all three 
of which are elaborated upon, to an extent, below.34
3. The ILO and the socio-economic rights of workers
As is evident from the discussion above, it seems that ILO’s social justice 
mandate is mainly focused on improving workers’ rights and their work con‑
ditions. What is more, the Organization is currently celebrating its 100 years 
of fighting for social justice, on and off its website. The ILO has noted that, 
alongside promoting a fair globalization, it has championed the concept of 
‘Decent Work’ as a global development goal.35 The Organization points out 
that its Decent Work concept was adopted by the international community 
through Goal 8 of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, which aims to 
‘promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and 
decent work for all’.36 Furthermore, the ILO notes that, through its Decent 
Work efforts, it has carried out a quest that addresses forced labour, slavery, 
and freedom at work since the early 1990s, and that the Organization 
has adopted multiple standards on such issues.37 For instance, the ILO’s 
Governing Body created the Special Action Programme to Combat Forced 
Labour (SAP‑FL) following the publication of ‘Stopping Forced Labour’ in 
2001.38 Eliminating forced labour has now become one of the most widely 
accepted norms in the international realm. The ILO’s website also notes 
that the Forced Labour Convention (No. 29) and the Abolition of Forced 
Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105) enjoy the highest rates of ratification 
among all ILO conventions. Despite this treaty ratification success, how‑
ever, forced labour, human trafficking and slavery practices continue to exist 
around the world.39
34 ibid 96.
35 ILO, ‘100 years of fighting for Social Justice’ (2019) <https://www.ilo.org/global/
about‑the‑ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_657787/lang‑‑en/index.htm>.
36 ibid; Sustainable Development Goals Fund, ‘Goal 8: Decent Work and Economic 
Growth’ <http://www.sdgfund.org/goal‑8‑decent‑work‑and‑economic‑growth>.
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It could appear from the preceding discussion that the focus of the 
ILO is solely on the improvement of working conditions. However, about a 
decade into the ILO’s life as an organization, and following the incidence of 
mass poverty that characterized the Great Depression in the United States, 
the expansion of the mandate of the Organization appeared necessary. As 
such, the ILO’s first Director affirmed that ‘the social factor must take 
precedence over the economic factor’.40 For him, social justice was a policy 
through which individuals are able to attain their ‘political, economic and 
moral rights’.41 Hence, it became clear as time went on that in order for the 
Organization to be successful at achieving social justice, it had to expand 
its mandate to cover more social and economic rights. Economic and social 
affairs were no longer considered an end or a goal in and of themselves, but 
rather a means of achieving the social justice end.
The preamble of the ILO Constitution sheds light on the principles 
that should guide the policies of member States. Although many of these 
objectives may be categorized as traditional labour standards – e.g. policies 
relating to the minimum wage, hours of work, and work conditions, 
among others – the Declaration of Philadelphia nonetheless contains, as 
Lee describes, ‘broad objectives which amount to the concept of a Welfare 
State’.42 For example, the Declaration contains objectives such as efforts 
towards the enjoyment of adequate housing, equality of education, full 
employment, child welfare, and higher standards of living. While the ILO’s 
1919 Constitution states that ‘labour should not be merely regarded as a 
commodity’, the 1944 Declaration conveys the same notion more affirma‑
tively and decidedly by explicitly asserting that ‘labour is not a commodity’. 
Hence, this Declaration reaffirms that the fundamental aim of ILO is the 
achievement of a broadened notion of social justice.
Furthermore, one of the key objectives of the Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work is to cooperate with ILO 
member States in their efforts to promote, among other issues, the 
40 Nicolas Valticos and Geraldo Potobsky, International Labour Law (2nd edn Kluwer 
1995) 26.
41 ibid.
42 Eddy Lee, ‘The Declaration of Philadelphia: Retrospect and Prospect’ (1994) 133 
International Labour Review 467, 471.
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elimination of discrimination and forced labour, freedom of association, 
and the right to collective bargaining.
Ten years later, ILO adopted the Declaration on Social Justice for a 
Fair Globalisation. According to its preface, this Declaration emerges at a 
crucial time ‘reflecting the wide consensus on the need for a strong social 
dimension to globalization in achieving improved and fair outcomes for 
all’. The Declaration promotes and reaffirms many other related objectives, 
such as fuller employment, and enhanced social security and labour protec‑
tion measures. The Declaration also states that member States have ‘a key 
responsibility to contribute, through their social and economic policy, to 
the realization of a global and integrated strategy for the implementation 
of the strategic objectives, which encompass the Decent Work Agenda’. 
Hence, it is yet again evident that this Declaration also has at its core goal 
the achievement of social justice, largely through the promotion of social 
and economic rights around the world.
4. The ILO and the rights of indigenous peoples
The ILO was the very first international organization to turn its atten‑
tion to the rights of indigenous peoples.43 The Organization has been 
engaging with indigenous peoples’ issues almost since the year of its creation. 
For instance, in 1921 the ILO carried out a number of studies on indigenous 
workers,44 and five years later, the Organization created the Committee of 
Experts on Native Labour, which gradually led to the adoption of a series of 
conventions related to native labour issues.45 Although all ILO’s conventions 
and declarations apply to indigenous and tribal peoples, the Organization 
adopted two international instruments open to ratification, which specifi‑
cally and exclusively address indigenous and ‘tribal’ peoples: the Indigenous 
and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No. 107) and its successor the 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169). These are the 
43 Athanasios Yupsanis, ‘The International Labour Organization and Its Contribution 
to the Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2016) 49 Canadian Yearbook of 
International Law 117, 118.
44 Hurst Hannum, ‘New Developments in Indigenous Rights’ (1988) 28 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 649, 652.
45 Patrick Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights (1st edn Manchester UP 
2002) 320.
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only international treaties that deal exclusively with the rights of indigenous 
peoples’ issues as they pertain to labour.46
Convention No. 107, which came into force in June 1959, was the 
first, and in fact remained for thirty years the only international legally 
binding instrument focusing on the individual rights of indigenous peo‑
ples.47 Convention No. 107 was particularly celebrated for having focused 
on the rights of indigenous peoples to their lands – despite overlooking the 
issue of access to natural resources in these lands. For instance, article 11 
recognizes the right of individual or collective ownership of the lands that 
indigenous peoples have traditionally occupied. Furthermore, article 12(1) 
mandates that indigenous peoples shall not be removed without their free 
consent from their habitual lands. The convention generally covers land 
rights,48 working conditions,49 social security and health,50 education and 
means of communication,51 and administration.52
While at face value such provisions seem to be in line with the fun‑
damental objective of achieving social justice, articulated in both the ILO 
Constitution and by Thomas Pogge, such provisions are undermined by a 
number of vague clauses that confer on member States the discretion to 
remove indigenous peoples from their traditional and habitual lands without 
their consent when this is ‘in accordance with national laws and regulations 
for reasons relating to national security, or in the interest of national eco‑
nomic development or of the health of the said populations’.53 The object of 
the convention is to protect and integrate indigenous peoples in the national 
societies within which they live, which, as Athanasios Yupsanis eloquently 
puts it, is a clear ‘paternalistic approach that was a product of the ethno‑
centric view of those populations as being ‘less advanced’.54 The dual aim 
to protect and integrate indigenous peoples into national societies is a role 
46 ILO ‘Indigenous and tribal peoples’ <https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/indige‑
nous‑tribal/lang‑‑en/index.htm>.
47 Yupsanis (n 43) 120.
48 Convention No. 107, articles 1‑10.
49 ibid article 15.
50 ibid articles 19‑20.
51 ibid articles 21‑26.
52 ibid article 27.
53 ibid article 12(1).
54 ibid article 1(1)(a); Yupsanis (n 43) 121.
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allocated primarily to member States, by virtue of article 2(1). One of the 
most fundamental elements of Convention No. 107 is the type of temporary 
State (affirmative) action required under the convention to realize the indi‑
genous peoples’ rights it guaranteed. In other words, the convention encour‑
ages States to take special measures wherever social, economic and cultural 
conditions hinder indigenous peoples’ lives. This positive duty is in fact 
subject to the provision that it need only continue as long as it would be 
deemed necessary to have a special protection mechanism, and should cease 
otherwise in order to avoid ‘creating or prolonging a state of segregation’.55
The paternalistic approach that this convention tended to be based on 
meant that indigenous peoples were left entirely out of the Organization 
and enforcement of such programs. Although the imposition of an obli‑
gation on the State to adopt such special measures was undoubtedly a 
positive development, especially at the time the convention was adopted, 
the temporary nature of the provisions is nonetheless largely problematic, 
as it tends to conflict with the aims and aspirations of indigenous peoples, 
most of whom reject the notion of assimilation and instead demand per‑
manent protection.56
It was in recognition of many of the problems with this convention 
that in September 1986, ILO’s Governing Body organized a fourteen‑day 
meeting of fifteen experts to investigate the possibility of amending the con‑
vention, given (a) indigenous peoples’ disapproval of Convention No. 107 
and (b) the shift in the attitude of both international bodies such as the 
UN, and many national governments.57 All fifteen experts unanimously 
condemned the assimilation approach of the convention,58 recommending 
that the convention be amended immediately in a way that would ensure 
that indigenous peoples had the greatest possible control over their eco‑
nomic and social development.59 The revision of the Convention No. 107 
resulted in the adoption of Convention No. 169 on 27 June 1989. Both 
55 ibid article 3(2)(a).
56 Garth Nettheim, ‘Peoples and Populations – Indigenous Peoples and the Rights of 
Peoples’ in James Crawford (ed), The Rights of Peoples (Clarendon Press 1988) 107, 125‑26.
57 Yupsanis (n 43) 129.
58 ibid.
59 Russel Barsh, ‘Revision of ILO Convention No. 107’ (1987) 81 American Journal 
of International Law 756, 761.
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conventions deal with the same subject‑matter in almost the same fashion, 
with one stark difference: the new convention abandons the assimilationist 
orientation of its predecessor. Thus, Convention No. 169 recognizes, inter 
alia, indigenous peoples’ right to their distinct and unique cultural iden‑
tity.60 The preamble of this newer treaty recognizes the aspirations of in‑
digenous peoples ‘to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of 
life and economic development and to maintain and develop their identi‑
ties, languages and religions within the framework of the States in which 
they live’.
Another major shift authored by the drafters and parties to the new con‑
vention is the replacement of the term ‘populations’, adopted in Convention 
No. 107 by that of ‘peoples’ in the new convention, given that indigenous 
peoples are, like other peoples, entitled to the right of self‑determination.61 
Although the inclusion of the term ‘peoples’ in this convention is positive, 
there exists a caveat in article 1(3) of the convention, stressing that ‘the use 
of the term peoples in this convention shall not be construed as having 
any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under 
international law’. In other words, the convention could be read by some as 
implicitly excluding the right of indigenous peoples to exercise self‑determi‑
nation. Hence, despite its successes, some argue that the new convention is 
still somewhat assimilationist in its spirit and in fact far more detrimental 
to the rights of indigenous peoples than its predecessor, given that ‘colo‑
nists have become a little more sophisticated’, abandoning the language of 
assimilation but yet retaining the underlying core policies unchanged.62 For 
instance, the newer convention still contains a requirement that indigenous 
customs and practices be compatible with the national legal system and 
internationally recognized human rights.63
60 Elizabeth Pearce, ‘Self‑Determination for Native Americans: Land Rights and the 
Utility of Domestic and International Law’ (1991) 22 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 
361, 382.
61 Scott Forrest, ‘Indigenous Self‑Determination in Finland: A Case Study in Normative 
Change’ (2006) 42 Polar Record 229.
62 Sharon Venne, ‘The New Language of Assimilation: A Brief Analysis of ILO 
Convention 169’ (1990) 2 Without Prejudice 53, 56, 66.
63 Convention No. 169, article 9(1).
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IV. Preliminary insights from a TWAIL engagement 
with the ILO’s social justice work
Having laid a foundation for the analysis that we follow, by explaining 
TWAIL (albeit only briefly), and thereafter outlining what we see as the 
‘commanding heights’ and ‘highlights’ of the ILO’s social justice discourse 
and praxis, this section focuses on dealing squarely with both its overarching 
objective (i.e. to shine a TWAIL torchlight on the ILO’s social justice work), 
and on its more specific – if closely integrated – goals (i.e. to tease out the 
similarities and differences between TWAIL’s social justice discourse and 
praxis and its ILO counterpart; and to reflect on what, if anything, these 
two bodies of work can learn from each other’s approach).
It should be noted at the outset that the point of this comparative exer‑
cise is not to identify which social justice discourse and praxis is better, as 
between the ILO’s and TWAIL’s. Rather it is simply to report our analyt‑
ical findings.
1. Similarities
The first similarity between TWAIL and the ILO social justice dis‑
course/praxis is, of course, that they are both focused (to an extent) on 
international law: its creation, character, implementation, impact, relevance, 
and dual capacity to both facilitate and hinder the struggle for social jus‑
tice.64 This much is evident from the discussions in sections II and III, and 
is hardly a controversial point. This is not, of course, to claim that the ILO 
and TWAIL are only focused on the international plane. For, both TWAIL 
and the ILO social justice work have certainly been transnational in at least 
one sense; in the sense of also working at and on the juncture between the 
‘international’ and the ‘domestic’. Both are as concerned with international 
law qua international law as they are with how it operates within States and 
societies.65 For instance, as we have already seen, the ILO’s core mandate 
and operational activities also focus on the real‑life conditions of workers on 
the domestic plane and on the conformity or otherwise of these conditions 
64 Chimni (n 11).
65 For an example of this kind of TWAIL scholarship, see Luis Eslava and Sundya 
Pahuja, ‘Beyond the (Post)colonial: TWAIL and the Everyday Life of International Law’ 
(2012) Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America 195.
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with international law.66 The ILO also focuses on what these conditions, 
and the views/actions of the actors within States that are responsible for 
their creation or amelioration, can tell us about the need for international 
regulatory reform in the worker’s rights/welfare area.67 This is one consid‑
eration that is at the centre of its tripartite approach.68 On TWAIL’s part, 
it is as concerned with the character of particular international treaties and 
practices, as it is with the ‘everyday life of international law’ at the ‘mundane 
level’ within Third World and other States (how it is applied by adminis‑
trative officials in tax departments, or by immigration officers at airports).69
The second similarity is that while the protection of workers’ rights is, 
of course, at the very core of the ILO’s social justice discourse and praxis, 
TWAIL is as concerned with the rights and labour conditions of working 
people, and some TWAIL scholars have also explicitly trained their lens and 
focused their efforts in the same direction, for instance, Upendra Baxi,70 
Obiora Okafor,71 Titilayo Adebola72 and Adrian Smith.73
The third similarity is that the concerns of TWAIL and the ILO for 
social justice are expressed, in part, through their deliberate, socially aware, 
and historically‑predicated engagement with economic and social rights (as 
opposed to only or mainly civil and political rights), and with their centrality 
to any credible global human rights scheme and any viable effort to uplift 
living standards and ensure world peace. As section III shows, this under‑
standing is palpable from even a cursory familiarity with the ILO’s consti‑
tutive document and work. That TWAIL work is undergirded by this kind 
of conceptual framework is as decipherable from the discussion in section II.





69 Eslava and Pahuja (n 65).
70 Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (Oxford UP 2006).
71 Obiora Chinedu Okafor, ‘Assessing Baxi’s Thesis on the Emergence of a Trade‑Related 
Market‑Friendly Human Rights Paradigm: Recent Evidence from Nigerian Labour‑Led 
Struggles’ (2007) 1 Law, Social Justice and Global Development.
72 Adebola (n 21).
73 Adrian Smith, ‘The Bunkhouse Rules: A Materialist Approach to Legal Consciousness 
in the Context of Migrant Workers’ Housing in Ontario’ (2015) 52 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 863.
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The last similarity that we have discerned is that while the ILO has dealt, 
in some way, with the rights of the indigenous peoples of both the Global 
North and the Global South for nearly 100 years now (however unsatisfacto‑
rily), TWAIL’s scholarly agenda has more recently grown beyond its concern 
mainly for the indigenous peoples of the Global South, to accommodate (if 
rather inadequately as well) the concerns of the indigenous peoples of the 
Global North – people who have been referred to as the ‘South within the 
North’.74 More recent work by Amar Bhatia illustrates this point.75
2. Differences
The discussion in the last paragraph contains within it the seed of the 
first difference that we have noticed between TWAIL and ILO social justice 
discourse and praxis. This is that the ILO’s engagement with the rights of 
indigenous peoples has been historically more global in reach and much 
more longstanding than TWAIL’s, even though this gap has closed more 
lately. This suggests that there could be a thing or two for TWAIL to learn 
from the ILO’s institutional memory and work in this area.
A related but differently oriented point is that the concern of TWAIL’s 
discourse and praxis with the rights of indigenous peoples has tended 
to be more deeply structural than the ILO’s. It has tended to be more 
closely oriented toward the ways in which indigenous peoples can exercise 
their rights to self‑determination and claim their autonomy in a robust 
way from largely domineering and repressive States around the world.76 
As we have seen, the ILO’s discourse and praxis in this area was initially 
more assimilationist, and later on became much less so, although it is still 
accused of standing significantly short of a framework that could offer 
discursive, normative, or even practical facilitation to the expression of the 
demands of many indigenous peoples for deeper structural reform leading 
to enhanced autonomy.
Another area in which TWAIL’s social justice discourse and praxis 
is more structural and thus poses a greater challenge to the conventional 
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distribution of global socio‑economic resources and their benefits. While it 
is capable of contributing to the restructuring of global wealth distribution 
along a number of axis, the ILO’s highly commendable efforts to enthrone 
a regime of decent work across the globe and ensure that many economic 
and social rights are enjoyed in a more widespread manner both within and 
across State borders is nevertheless circumscribed and limited by the fact 
that it more‑or‑less does not really extend beyond this point. By contrast, 
while TWAIL’s social justice discourse and praxis largely aligns with the 
ILO in this area, it goes well beyond to target squarely and consistently the 
structural barriers that create the massive inequalities in the enjoyment of 
economic and social rights across the world in the first place.
It is thus no surprise then that while TWAIL’s social justice discourse 
and praxis is in addition also heavily focused on right to development dis‑
course and praxis, and on the need for that right to be framed and experi‑
enced more and more in binding legal terms, the ILO does not appear to 
have been as focused as TWAIL has on this approach. Right to development 
discourse and praxis is a structural approach to the effort to achieve social 
justice across the world.
It also appears that TWAIL’s social justice discourse and praxis tends 
to be more suspicious of assertions of our common humanity and imposi‑
tions of allegedly or even legitimately universal standards, as either existing 
or desirable, usually backed by claims of our common humanity. While our 
common humanity is an alluring goal to achieve, it has never really been as 
widely accepted and internalized in real life around the world as it would 
otherwise appear. From the time of Vittoria to this day, assertions of our 
common humanity have not always turned out all that well for subaltern, 
less powerful, peoples. And so, while universal standards can, of course, be 
desirable, and can often be a force for good, TWAIL teaches us to embrace 
them with caution. Universality is not to be embraced at the drop of a 
hat, without a deep and careful considering its intended and unintended 
consequences. To be clear, TWAIL does not tend to argue that common 
humanity claims and universal standards possess a fixed subordinating or 
oppressive valency, or are always a bad thing. Rather, to emphasize by repe‑
tition, the point is to be more suspicious of these claims and standards, and 
to embrace them on a case by case basis. No rejection of multilateralism is 
entailed here, and no embrace of unilateralism is suggested either.
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The last difference between the ILO and TWAIL social justice dis‑
courses and praxis that is commented on in this paper is that while the 
ILO’s work in this regard has been strong from the beginning about the 
need to view the State, especially the Third World State, as far from a ‘supra‑
class’ entity (that possessed little internal variegation and in that regard and 
that was not riven by socio‑economic class divisions), with notable excep‑
tions, earlier TWAIL work tended to exhibit a degree of studied ignorance 
in this regard. The ILO is, of course, almost intrinsically designed to deal 
with the State on the basis of its differentiation into different ‘class’ interests.
Turning to what can the ILO and TWAIL social justice discourses/
praxis learn from each other, the first teachable point is that TWAIL needs 
to continue to focus – as it has now been over the last two decades – on 
not treating the Third World State as supra‑class. It needs to continue to 
examine the class and other divisions within the Third World itself which 
support or facilitate international law’s contribution to the subordination 
and immiseration of all too many people in the States that self‑identity 
as such.77 The ILO’s social justice discourse and praxis has been excellent 
at this.
By contrast, the ILO may benefit (within the significant political con‑
straints it certainly faces and has to survive within) from a greater attention 
to the structural; a turn to an approach that is intrinsic to TWAIL. It will 
benefit by paying greater attention to the structural barriers that, in the 
first place, produce the social injustices that it has to deal with. Without a 
greater success at upsetting the structures that produce these injustices, they 
will simply continue to expand in scale and intensity, and in their negative 
impact of the lives of the workers of the world, and especially those who 
are from the Global South. This expansion in scale and intensity has been 
the world experience for some time now.
Lastly, the ILO may also benefit from a greater attention to the ways 
in which even well meaning universally applied standards could, in reality, 
work against the interests of Third World peoples who are the vast majority 
of humanity after all. As we all know, same treatment does not always lead 
to equity.
77 See, for instance, Bhupinder Chimni, ‘International Institutions Today: An Imperial 
Global State in the Making’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 1.
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V. Conclusion
In conclusion, the overarching point is that TWAIL and the ILO are 
engaged in a discourse and praxis of global social justice that is both similar 
and different, and that both will do well to learn from each other’s approach. 
However, it is realized that as TWAIL is a scholarly movement and the ILO 
a political institution, the latter may face certain kinds of constraints as to 
the approach it can take in this regard that the former does not. Still, as we 
have seen, as international institutions go, the ILO is the closest to TWAIL 
in terms of its goals and approaches.
However, this paper has two key limitations. The first is that it does 
not unpack the negotiating histories of the ILO Constitution, conventions 
and recommendations. In other words, it does not consider the issue of 
whose voices mattered and whose interests prevailed in the construction 
and development of the ILO’s legal architecture. The second is that the 
paper does not delve into any kind of detailed analysis of the ILO decisions 
and ‘jurisprudence’.
